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During recent collaboration with colleagues to revise our institution’s general-education curricu-
lum, I encountered many perceptions of what we mean by the Natural Sciences. I was surprised
to find that perceptions of scientific pedagogy varied significantly among the scientific disciplines,
especially concerning issues of philosophy of science and epistemology, manifested in the approaches
to teaching theoretical concepts and their development. These realizations suggest that Physics oc-
cupies a singular role in college curricula, introducing students, even at the introductory level, to the
acquisition of knowledge by theoretical means and the assessment of theory based on experimental
evidence.
I am a physics professor at a small liberal arts college
in the mid-Atlantic states, where in the last several years
I have worked with colleagues from other departments to
review and revise the college’s general-education curricu-
lum. This has been a great experience; I’ve learned much
from my colleagues, and I believe that my appreciation
for liberal education and my ability to be an effective
academic advisor have increased dramatically. I’ve ben-
efited from being a part of many fascinating discussions
of pedagogical approach involving passionate educators.
I think that my future physics classes will be enriched by
techniques that I’ll be borrowing from colleagues across
campus, including those as seemingly remote as the Arts
and Humanities.
However, with the review process in its final stages,
I’ve encountered perceptions of the Natural Sciences that
have left me baffled and concerned about how we present
the Sciences to our students and the public. These have
not come, as one might assume, from faculty in non-
science disciplines, but from faculty in the Natural Sci-
ences. This situation has confused me about the way I’ve
approached my teaching and my scholarship in physics.
I’ve found that colleagues from other disciplines have
opinions on this, too, and the comments that I make
below should be accessible to anyone.
To set the stage for my argument (and to demonstrate
what is at stake), I want to begin with a story with which
the reader is likely familiar, one which I consider to be
the quintessence of theoretical inquiry.
A. Einstein and the development of General
Relativity
In 1907, Albert Einstein was thinking about gravity.[1]
Two years earlier, Einstein had what is now referred to as
his annus mirabilis. The 1905 publication of his ground-
breaking articles on special relativity, Brownian motion,
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and the photoelectric effect built the foundation for Ein-
stein’s place as the most prolific theoretical physicist of
the 20th century. But in 1907, midway on his trajectory
from the outer fringe to the center of the physics com-
munity, Einstein was troubled by gravity.
At the time, the working theory of gravitation was that
of Isaac Newton, dating back to at least 1687. Newtonian
gravity can be captured in the form of a single law: the
attractive gravitational force between two objects is pro-
portional to their masses and inversely proportional to






where Fg is the attractive force between two objects with
masses m1 and m2 separated by distance r, and G is a
proportionality constant that quantifies the strength of
the interaction. (G has the same value for all pairs of
objects.)
This law has many consequences, some of which are
broad and conceptual. For example, this law suggests
that any two objects with mass gravitationally attract,
i.e., that gravitational attraction is a universal phe-
nomenon. This is a revolutionary idea! If you are reading
this essay on a computer there is an attractive gravita-
tional force between it and you, but it’s roughly twenty
orders of magnitude (i.e., a hundred-billion-billion times)
smaller than the gravitational force that the Earth exerts
on you. Newton’s gravitational law unified seemingly un-
related events such as the falling of an apple or the streak-
ing of a comet across the night sky, revealing that they
are manifestations of the same gravitational interaction.
Some of the consequences of Newton’s theory are more
specific. The details of eq. 1 are quite interesting, but it
is the existence of eq. 1 that is more important to our
point. The mathematical nature of the universal grav-
itation law allows us to make quantitative predictions
and compare these to observations. Newtonian gravity
has had immense successes when used in this way. For
many phenomena, on scales from those of solar systems
to bench-top laboratory experiments (see e.g. [2]), New-
ton’s theory of gravitation can predict results that are
2consistent with experimental measurements. For many
modern problems such as planning interplanetary satel-
lite flight paths [3] application of Newton’s 300-year-old
law is sufficient!
However, Newtonian gravity does present some glaring
problems of both the broad and specific types described
above. One of the more compelling specifics, known since
the 1860’s, was the precession of the orbit of Mercury: as
Mercury orbits the Sun, its elliptical trajectory shifts in a
way that can not be accounted for by Newtonian theory.
By the late 1800’s there were possible explanations that
could reconcile this observation within Newton’s frame-
work (e.g., other hidden planets affecting Mercury’s or-
bit), none of these panned out.
A perhaps more fundamentally troubling aspect of
Newton’s theory is the consequence that the accelera-
tion of an object in a gravitational field (i.e., the rate at
which its velocity changes under the influence of grav-
ity) does not depend on the object’s mass, even though
the gravitational force does. (If you’ve taken a physics
class, this is why we talk of the acceleration due to grav-
ity (9.8 m/s2) for objects near the Earth’s surface.) This
feature of gravity is one of the first things that we teach
students in an introductory physics course, but it was
(before Einstein) a deep mystery and a suspicious coin-
cidence.
In 1907, while still working as a patent clerk, Einstein
had what he later referred to as “the happiest thought
of [his] life.” The Thought is an incredibly simple one:
a person undergoing free-fall (i.e., falling under the in-
fluence of only gravity) does not feel her own weight.
Einstein imagined a person falling off of a roof, but I en-
courage you to imagine an executive taking the elevator
to her office when the elevator’s support cables suddenly
break. If, out of surprise, she releases her briefcase as the
elevator is falling she will observe that it does not leave
the position in which she held it. An external observer, of
course, would say that both the executive and her brief-
case were falling with the same acceleration. Einstein’s
insight was to realize that to the person in this elevator,
it would appear that no gravitational force acted on her
or the briefcase. The broader consequence of this thought
is that there is no local test that the falling person can
perform to distinguish between falling freely under the
influence of gravity or floating in the absence of gravita-
tional forces. The same is true to the astronauts aboard
the ISS; they appear weightless, even though they are
constantly falling in a circular orbit around the Earth.
Fueled by The Thought, Einstein spent the next eight
years developing the general theory of relativity (GR),
a wedding of his earlier special relativistic theory and
gravitation. Einstein’s development of GR is a paragon
of what physicists mean when they refer to “theoretical
physics.” His program was based on a conceptual in-
sight, which was then expanded into a rich framework
of mathematical and logical tools. This work was mo-
tivated as much by mathematical consistency, necessity,
and beauty as by physical observations. Einstein pulled
insights from areas of mathematics previously thought to
be purely logical constructs to develop a new language for
gravitation. Einstein’s work presented what appears to
be the language of gravity at large scales.
In the same way as Newton’s theory, GR gives us both
broad, profound principles and specific predictions. It
makes definite, quantitative predictions that can be com-
pared to experimental observations. GR has predicted
many novel phenomena (black holes, gravitational lens-
ing, gravitational time dilation, et c.), some of which have
already been observed and some of which we still seek.
In this way, GR is testable; there are definite tests that
we can perform, which, if theoretical and experimental
results disagreed, would indicate that GR is not the com-
plete theory of gravity. To date, there are some reasons
to expect that GR is an incomplete description of grav-
ity, but there are few experimental observations that GR
cannot explain. Despite its beauty, power, and success, I
doubt that any physicist would claim that General Rel-
ativity is the end of the story.
One more note, just for fun. Einstein was famously
sardonic when commenting on experiment. In 1919, a
huge expedition was undertaken to make measurements
of a phenomenon that was predicted by GR, but was
outside the realm of Newtonian gravity: the deflection
of starlight by the Sun during the May 29 solar eclipse.
Though GR passed this first empirical test with flying
colors, Einstein was seemingly cool. When asked how he
would have reacted had the experiment shown no deflec-
tion, Einstein famously responded “I would have had to
pity our dear Lord. The theory is correct all the same.”
B. The general-education curriculum
My college’s current curriculum is one typical of a lib-
eral arts college, requiring students to study across all of
our academic divisions, engage and improve skills such
as written and oral communication, and to draw con-
nections between their courses in different departments.
During our curriculum review process, we have identified
that we are in a charmed position in that this curricu-
lum is working well within the limitations of the college’s
resources. Thus, a large part of our proposed overhaul
has been a reworking of the language that describes our
curriculum, so that students and faculty can better un-
derstand the importance and goals of its requirements,
and to prompt students to exercise more agency in their
course choices. This refining of language has led to some
structural improvements, but the overall structure of the
curriculum will not change much with this new iteration.
If there has been a guiding principle in assembling our
new curriculum, it has been that students should be ex-
posed to all of the methods by which humans gather and
interpret information about our world. Others who have
gone through similar processes will likely commiserate
that defining such general education categories is diffi-
cult. One wants to make a description of, e.g., The Arts
3or The Social Sciences simultaneously powerful and com-
prehensive, but also accessible to students at any point in
their studies (as well as prospective students and parents,
if possible). How does one describe to an eighteen-year-
old what The Social Sciences are? What knowledge or
experiences do teenagers have that can leveraged in this
task? Such descriptions should be brief and digestible,
but should also present a strong argument for why the
discipline is essential to responsible and engaged citizen-
ship. I am proud that my colleagues have succeeded in
balancing these features and in assembling a curriculum
whose primary goal is to guide (rather than just to force)
students through our offerings and help them get the
most out of their time at our school. Though I antic-
ipated it to be protracted and painful, our assembly of a
description of the Natural Sciences was (relatively) quick
and benefited greatly from input from faculty in all de-
partments.
C. Theory: A division in The Natural Sciences
But a devil was lurking in the details. One of the
features of our new curricular descriptions is that we seek
to give the student some idea of the tools with which
knowledge is gathered and evaluated in these fields. For
most of the review process, the following description has
been attached to The Natural Sciences:
These courses teach students to investigate
the principles on which an understanding
of the natural world rests, and present the
means by which these principles are assem-
bled using the tools of experimental observa-
tion, theoretical investigation, modeling, and
data collection and analysis.
This list is not perfect! I can’t say that I think a student
would know what each of these terms means before taking
one of my courses, but I do think that a student who suc-
cessfully completed an introductory physics course could
say whether or not she engaged each of these tools.
Toward the end of the process, a colleague who is
shepherding the curriculum review contacted me to ask
whether dropping “theoretical investigation” from the
list would present a problem from the perspective of the
Physics Department. The justification given by the re-
view committee for omitting this item was that “if some-
thing is a scientific theory it no longer requires investiga-
tion.” I had to read that phrase a few times to extract its
essence. This was not the opinion of the person who con-
tacted me; she was trying to paraphrase the (adamant)
suggestions of another committee member and several
science faculty who had been consulted.
It is rare that one is asked to speak on behalf of one’s
entire field. I am very aware of the reputation that the
physics community has for arrogance, a dismissiveness of
other scholarly endeavors, an aversion to fool-suffering (in
addition to a rather broad definition of “fool”). I like to
think that I strive to counter this in my professional life.
Though I was quite alarmed by this claim, I proceeded
with caution and tried to extend the benefit of doubt.
I assumed that the disconnect here was one of super-
ficial differences in language between fields. I carefully
wrote a response that said that I think theoretical inves-
tigation (though “investigation” might not be the best
word) has been, and still is, an essential part of the ac-
crual of scientific knowledge. I mentioned that theoretical
frameworks give us a way to interpret and understand ex-
perimental results, but also help to distinguish between
productive and unproductive lines of experimental in-
quiry. From theories, we make quantitative predictions,
and these predictions are tested by experiment. I cited
examples, such as the development of General Relativity
(GR), where theoretical inquiry presaged a revolution in
scientific thinking, but needed to be tested by experiment
before gaining wide acceptance. I claimed that when I
teach a physics lecture course, these types of develop-
ments and the tools that accompany them are what I am
teaching. I try to be careful to point out the stages of
development in a scientific theory, and the experimental
evidence that suggested them.
My reply was sent back to the group for discussion.
Members of our Chemistry and Biology Departments
were contacted about whether they would have reserva-
tions about dropping any mention of theory from the
list. When I was told that no one voiced any reserva-
tions about this, I lost my composure and replied that I
was “baffled.” My bafflement was met with the follow-
ing explanation, which I’ll reproduce in full for fear of
paraphrasing inaccurately:
Theories in biology are developed AFTER ex-
perimentation and not before. A theory (in
the biological sciences) is a fact and is NOT
a mere prediction. A concept that has with-
stood the test of time and repeated exper-
imentation using multiple approaches is ac-
cepted as a theory. For example, evolution by
natural selection is a theory. Experiments are
performed assuming evolution occurs. It is a
guiding principle in other investigations, but
it in itself is not being investigated. What we
investigate are hypotheses and not theories.
When I read this now, I realize that it was provided partly
to clear up my confusion over differences in language.
Physicists, at least in my field, rarely use the term “hy-
pothesis.” I understand that part of the above claim is
that there is a hierarchy of such ideas, and that Biology
distinguishes between “theories” and “hypotheses.”
My disagreement with the above claim is an epistemo-
logical one. When I plan and present a course, I have in
my mind old-fashioned Popperian notions of theory and
evidence[4], viz. that all theories are provisional. Theo-
ries cannot be proven true by experimentation. Rather,
the best we can do is make predictions based on a theory
and determine whether these predictions are consistent
4with observation. If so, then the theory survives until
the next experiment. Thus, I see my task as being two-
find: present the theory and amass an amount of evidence
for it such that the theory becomes convincing and (at
best) intuitive to the student. Though quantum inde-
terminism and more recent shifts in scientific thinking
have suggested that falsifiability is not the absolute as
presented by Popper, I think that this is the more care-
ful way to educate young scientists. It certainly prevents
one from claiming that theories are facts.
In physics, theories are constructs that we work with.
They are vital constructs that guide experimental in-
quiry, but they are also tools for inquiry. Neither exper-
imental or theoretical investigation survives on its own
(though there is a vocal post-empiricism faction of the-
ory community). Theories are approximations of reality;
some are quite good, some only work well for specific
regimes, and some may stand the test of time and, as a
chemist colleague put it, asymptotically approach fact.
The proposed treatment of theories as “facts”, even if
used sloppily in a debate between colleagues, really wor-
ries me.
Evolution by natural selection is a particularly nuanced
example. Natural selection is an amazing idea! It pro-
vides an explanation for (i.e., is consistent with) many
observations that we make of nature, and we see its effects
unfolding in phenomena such as (unfortunately) the evo-
lution of bacteria that are harmful to humans and other
species [5]. It is a rich way of understanding our world.
However, it is very different from many of the theories
that we engage in physics. Physical theories must be pre-
dictive in a quantitative sense. Given the framework of
GR, one can the dynamics of a binary star system and the
gravitational radiation that it emits, which could then be
compared to experiment. Evolutionary theory does not
offer the same handholds. Can we anticipate something
like a maximum evolutionary phase for bacteria such as
MRSA? Though it may be possible to develop models
that speak to such questions, these models likely aren’t
contingent upon the veracity of Natural Selection, and
thus these models do not grant falsification power.
In physics, theories are testable because of their quan-
titative power. In my opinion, this is an essential lesson
in physics pedagogy. In fact, one of the biggest prob-
lems that we have with students in introductory physics
classes is helping them to understand that in the lab,
they are testing predictions. These predictions are not
exactly sophisticated, and they have already been tested
by generations of students before them, but it’s impor-
tant for them to realize that they are doing something
much more than just making measurements to charac-
terize a single system. The theories that they test are
applicable to many systems other than the one that they
study in a particular experiment, and we must be careful
that they do not lose sight of this.
I see another thorny difference between an paradigm
such as Natural Selection and many physical theo-
ries. Evolutionary theory is a culturally and politically
charged concept. I think it is epistemologically accurate
to say that “Diversity of species due to evolution by nat-
ural selection is a theory; it has not been proven,” in the
sense that a theory cannot be proven by an experiment.
However, this statement carries grave connotations, and
has implications for issues such as education and pub-
lic policy. There are some circles, both academic and
non-academic, in which saying the above would garner
the “Ummm, who invited this guy?” look. The same
is not true of many similar statements regarding physi-
cal theories. I can not imagine a group that would meet
“Quantum mechanics is a theory; it has not been proven”
with the same disgust.
A chemist at my college has offered a more careful
way of thinking about such paradigms. He suggests that
“evolution is such a powerful explanatory paradigm, the
odds are high that it is in fact true.” I like this statement,
though I would wager that there are statisticians that
would take offense at how one assigns odds to such things.
I guess you can’t please everybody!
D. Theory in introductory physics pedagogy
At some point during the discussion, a colleague from
another science department suggested that the list of
tools that we really want is one that describes what our
students will actually be doing in their courses (not nec-
essarily those that professionals use), and that an un-
dergraduate curriculum either doesn’t have the time or
depth to undertake theoretical investigation. I am sym-
pathetic to this argument. Biology students need an
enormous amount of background knowledge to be able
to talk intelligently about their field and be proficient
enough to complete advanced courses. I understand that
in order to facilitate this proficiency, classes in biology
and introductory chemistry need to be taught in a cer-
tain way. My colleagues’ arguments seemed to imply that
this is the way that all science pedagogy works, and that
I should adopt a more realistic perspective of my role as
a professor.
As I see it, the pedagogical approach is almost com-
pletely different in physics. The introductory physics
courses that I teach are predominantly peopled by bright
and tenacious biology, chemistry, and psychology stu-
dents, many of whom are planning a career in medicine. I
often joke with these students that they’re in for a treat:
they’re only going to learn ten or so things in the first
semester of physics. They can forget about reading the
book multiple times, deploying a rainbow fleet of high-
lighters, or carrying a stack of flashcards. What they
will be expected to do is solve problems – many prob-
lems. They will have to find a way to turn the knowl-
edge that they get from the book and lectures into un-
derstanding; this is done by solving problems, looking for
patterns, and taking a forest-rather-than-trees approach.
The problems that will be on the exams will not be the
same as the ones that they did in the homework; if they
5want to succeed, they will need to understand the course
material and be creative with it. I am deliberate in telling
my students these things because this idea of creative ap-
plication is a huge shift in learning styles for them.
To those that doubt that meaningful theoretical in-
quiry happens at the introductory level, I offer the fol-
lowing. Before the mid-1800’s, humans did not know
what atoms were. There were certainly guesses about
their existence (dating back to the ancient Greeks!), but
empirical evidence was little. One of the more puzzling
features of Nature was gases – they could be felt, but
not seen, and it was clear that they had some relation to
other forms of matter due to processes like boiling. At
the time, many bulk characteristics of gases were known.
When experimenters compressed a gas, they found that
its temperature increased, and so forth, according to sim-
ple mathematical relationships. In their second semester
of physics, we propose to students an insight: What if
gases are made up of tiny particles, too small to see, and
they just bounce around inside of a volume and don’t in-
teract with one another? The students, willing to humor
their instructor, find that forty minutes later, after apply-
ing a little algebra and a few (three) basic relationships
from the first semester, they have derived the empirical
gas laws. This is a compelling suggestion (not proof!)
that atoms exist. In addition, we lead them through as-
sessing what assumptions they’ve made along the way
and when their derivations should be valid. This is a
powerful way of gaining knowledge, and I don’t know a
way to describe it other than “theoretical inquiry.” For
students who are able to place themselves in the shoes
of those that first worked through such calculations, this
exercise is an emphatic lesson about the importance of
theoretical inquiry.
E. Theory’s place in general education
Where does this leave the general-education curricu-
lum? I am thankful that faculty more intelligent and
more eloquent than I were consulted on this question,
and that “theoretical inquiry” has made the list! But,
I’m left feeling a little odd about “Natural Sciences” as a
general education bucket. Let me approach the situation
this way: I have two hypotheses.
My first hypothesis is obviously silly, but I will present
it in the interest of being rigorous, and also because I
worry that some of my colleagues think that I think it is
true.
Hypothesis 1: By virtue of the fact that I
am a physicist, my opinions on science and
science pedagogy are the correct ones, and I
thus have the authority to tell colleagues in
other departments how their jobs should be
done.
When I say that this hypothesis is silly, what I mean is
that it is not consistent with observations. The frequency
and magnitude with which I’ve been wrong in the past
suggest that this hypothesis should be abandoned. In ad-
dition, the other Natural Sciences departments are also
adequately preparing their students for graduate pro-
grams and careers, so this hypothesis doesn’t present
a clear path forward. I don’t know enough about the
courses in the other science departments or about their
respective fields; rather, I’m relying on what my col-
leagues in those departments tell me. My intuition is
that this hypothesis has little to do with reality.
Hypothesis 2: The learning of physics is
something fundamentally different from the
learning of biology or chemistry, and we need
to be aware of this when speaking of the Nat-
ural Sciences as a unified discipline.
To a degree, I am ambivalent about this statement. Some
courses in my college’s chemistry major, such as Physi-
cal Chemistry or Quantum Chemistry, are taught in ways
very similar to those of our upper-level physics courses:
the development of mathematically expressed theories
and their experimental evidence are presented. But, from
what my colleagues are suggesting, the modes of learning
that students engage in biology and introductory chem-
istry courses are wildly different from those that they en-
gage in introductory (and later) physics courses. I doubt
that this is a controversial idea, but it does have a po-
tentially striking consequence. We assume that the goal
of curricular requirements is to make our students en-
gage all of the ways by which humans gain knowledge, so
that they can act as responsible citizens and appreciate
and evaluate information on their own. If this is so, then
the lumping of science courses into one curricular cate-
gory, requiring students to take only one or two courses
from among the Natural Science disciplines, presents an
incomplete curriculum.[6]
The story of Einstein and the development of GR is, of
course, well beyond the scope of an introductory course
for general-education students. However, theoretical de-
velopments such as this, especially those that dramati-
cally change the way that we think about the Universe
and our study of it, are powerful ways of knowing and are
integral to the progress of science. Thus, when we teach
science, we should be clear about the power of theory.
Our physics department has neither the resources nor
the desire to accommodate all of the students at our col-
lege. Introductory Physics is not a course that’s appro-
priate for every student, mostly (in my opinion) due to
the mathematical familiarity it requires. In addition, I
think that this further separation of the natural sciences
isn’t a productive line of discussion for our current cur-
riculum review. In my mind, a curriculum is only as
good as the academic advising that students receive, and
I think that our faculty are very good at this. I offer
these comments simply because they surprised me. Now
that I know that these perspectives exist in higher edu-
cation, I’ll seek ways to make my teaching of theoretical
manipulations and philosophy of science more deliberate.
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scribed above are shared by the majority of non-physics
educators. But I do take away from this experience a
renewed appreciation for the theoretical inquiry that is
an essential component of physics. It is fashionable in
physics for experimentalists to grumble about their the-
orist counterparts and vice versa, but I think we should
be more proud and vocal of this special relationship. It
seems that the relation of the theoretical community in
the life sciences has been overlooked at my institution;
I don’t know if any of our faculty in these departments
could be described as “theorists”. For a similar turn to
happen in physics would be against the nature of the dis-
cipline, and I have a new-found respect for what a great
relationship this is.
Science denial is all around us. Its manifestations
range from tacit and annoying (think of the latest fad
diet) to bold and catastrophically dangerous (think about
the debates over immunization or global warming, or
perhaps just the fact that there are debates about such
things). I don’t think that being careless with epistemo-
logical concerns helps non-scientists to understand what
science allows us to know, and I actually worry that it
makes non-scientists more skeptical. When we’re not
truthful or up-front about science’s limitations, we’re not
doing an honest job of educating people about its place
in our lives. As science faculty, we often disdain our col-
leagues in other fields for not being transparent about
the scope of their inquiry, and I think that it’s time we
turn the lens on ourselves.
There are certain assumptions that it seems we must
make in order to do productive scientific work. Perhaps
the most fundamental of these is that there exists an ob-
jective physical reality for us to describe! On top of this
we stack all manner of other assumptions: causality, lo-
cality, et c. I would wager that there are very few NSF
grant proposals that begin with something like “Assum-
ing that there is an objective physical reality, and that
causality and locality are safe bets, we propose to study
the synthesis of insulin in...” I don’t know if I would go
to this level in my courses, either.
Perhaps the assumptions made in the Life Sciences
about the fundamental nature of principles such as Nat-
ural Selection are of the same class. It seems, however,
that physics offers ways of testing the principles that were
thought to be basic assumptions. Indeed, the jury has
been out on how to think about locality (the idea that an
object can only be influenced by its immediate surround-
ings) since the mid-1960’s; experimentalists and theorists
continue to investigate. To me, the power to test the big
ideas is the allure of doing science, and I have seen my
students recognize the same. In addition to the episte-
mological problem stated above, I think that presenting
scientific paradigms as fact gives students the impression
that Science is complete. I can’t speak for the Life Sci-
ences, but this is certainly not the case in physics; there
are many open questions in the field and some promising
experimental and theoretical leads. Being careful in the
classroom gives us a better chance of having more gen-
eration of scientists equipped to answer these questions,
and a public that supports and values this work.
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